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This study uses a multi-agent system to simulate the behaviour of economic players in a context of 
rapidly evolving environmental policy. The area under study is represented by a sector of a French 
overseas Department, Réunion Island, with a high concentration of pig farms in the upland region and 
extensive sugarcane plantations in the coastal zone. We first simulate local pig farmers’ reactions to 
several policy options aimed at reducing the pollution coming from pig rearing. Multi-agent simulations 
are then coupled with cost-benefit analysis in order to calculate the net present value of different policy 
options. Advantages and limits of the use of the proposed methods to support decision-making are 
finally discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nitrogen and phosphorous rich effluents from intensive 
livestock farms are generally considered good fertilisers, 
but can become a source of pollution for the soil, surface 
and ground water when they reach excessive concentra- 
tions. In areas of high-density livestock production, the 
persistent accumulation of elements such as nitrogen is a 
widespread problem.  
In the European Union (EU), national and continental 
policies have been implemented to regulate the spreading 
of these effluents on farm land (in France: Ministerial 
Orders of 1992 modified in 1999, Code of Good Farming 
Practice, 1994; in the EU: Nitrates Directive n. 91/676/CE). 
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Abbreviations 
   
CBA, Cost-Benefit Analysis; EU, European Union; MAS, Multi-Agent 
System; NPV, Net Present Value; OM, Organic Matter; PV, Present 
Value; SWL, Sow With Litters. 
Besides the specific legislation about livestock effluents, 
under the French law, pig farms are  considered “environ- 
mentally sensitive installations" (cf. National Act  on Envi- 
ronmentally Sensitive Installations -ICPE- of 1976 and 
subsequent modifications), and the recent National Water 
Act of 30 December 2006, which integrates the European 
Water Framework Directive (n.2000/60/CE), provided for 
a pollution charge to be levied by the catchment agencies 
on livestock producers on the basis of the polluter-pays 
principle. On the other side, the State, the local authorities 
and the catchment agencies can provide subsidies to par- 
tially or totally cover farmers’ costs for the investments re- 
quired to comply with the new environmental regulations. 
Under the European Nitrates Directive and after a long 
negotiation with national farmers’ organisations, France 
launched a system based on maximum spreading limits 
according to the vulnerability and current degree of pollu- 
tion of land on which spreading may be implemented. In 
structural excess zones (i.e. areas where livestock produc- 
tion is particularly intensive), the authorized maximum 
annual nitrogen disposal was set at 170 kg per hectare. 
In   this  context  of rapidly  evolving  and  increasingly  
  
 
 
stringent legal requirements, stock breeders are faced 
with a new system of constraints and economic incentives 
(taxes, subsidies), which are likely to modify their  appro- 
ach to effluent management. 
Réunion is a French overseas Department situated in 
the Indian Ocean, 700 Km east of Madagascar. Despite 
its tropical climate and hence a very different cycle of 
nitrogen assimilated by crops if compared to the French 
mainland one (higher plant productivity, different minera- 
lisation  kinetics),  the  island is subject to French regula- 
tions. 
 Livestock breeders in Grand Ilet, an area of Réunion 
Island characterised by a high concentration of pig farms, 
face the problem of dealing with large quantities of 
excess slurry, which they cannot fully dispose of by 
spreading, as they do not have sufficient arable land. 
Moreover, they grow mainly fresh vegetables, on which 
slurry spreading is prohibited.  
In response to the exorbitant quantities of nitrogen 
provided to crops by slurry spreading in Grand Ilet (more 
than 1.5 T/ha per year on each cultivated plot, according 
to Renault and  Paillat, 1999)  and the environmental pro- 
blems associated with this practice, two  technical/organi- 
sational alternative solutions have been proposed. One 
consists of exporting the pig effluents outside the Grand 
Ilet zone to crops such as sugarcane, which require large 
quantities of organic matter. The other solution is to 
transform the liquid effluents into more manageable solid 
products (compost) for use on the crops of pig breeders 
or by other farmers and vegetables/flowers growers 
outside the pig production zone.  
Local authorities can make use of the French and EU 
mentioned legislations to orient pig farmers’ behaviour in 
the direction of a disposal of effluents complying with the 
new environmental regulations. Here, emphasis is placed 
on the combination of economic instruments (pollution 
charges and investment subsidies) and regulatory  instru- 
ments (limits of nitrogen disposal per hectare). 
This study proposes an approach that couples multi-
agent simulations and cost-benefit analysis to support 
public decision-makers in the  choice  of the policy mea- 
sures to implement in order to improve the local pig 
farms’ effluents disposal. 
To this purpose, the cost of different technical options 
available to pig farmers has been first incorporated into 
Echos, a multi-agent system (MAS) representing livestock 
effluent management in Réunion Island. Echos allows 
studying the impacts that potential environmental policies 
and investments are likely to have on pig farmers’ 
behaviour, as well as the economic viability and manage- 
ment choices and the economic costs associated with 
environmental legal compliance as well as the subsequent 
diffusion of nitrogen pollution in the  environment. The 
simulation platform utilised in this study is Cormas, multi-
agent dedicated software developed at CIRAD (Bousquet 
et al., 1998). 
A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was then implemented on 
the ten year scenarios resulting from running Echos simu- 
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ations that represent two different policy alternatives. The 
CBA allowed calculating the economic net present value 
of the adoption of each policy option when compared to 
the current situation (status quo). 
A description of the MAS structure and dynamics is 
provided in the following section 2. Section 3 illustrates 
and discusses a selection of scenarios obtained through 
Echos and the results of the CBA conducted on these 
scenarios. Some concluding remarks and future develop- 
ments of  the  research programme are proposed in sec- 
tion 4. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Multi-agent systems and cost-benefit analysis 
 
MAS in their simplest form consist of models of individuals. These 
individuals are often superimposed on an automated environment 
and are capable of observing their environment, analysing what 
they observe, and of modifying their behaviour accordingly (Ferber, 
1999). 
“Agent-based modelling takes a bottom-up approach to 
generating data comparable to that observable in the real system” 
(Deadman, 1999). This bottom-up approach consists of defining 
methods that correspond to the behaviour of individuals, which are 
part of the real world system analysed. These methods do not 
specify the overall behaviour of the simulations, which instead 
emerges as a result of the actions and interactions of the individual 
agents (Deadman, 1999). 
Agents can be considered adaptive if they possess the following 
criteria:  
 
a.) the outcome of the agent’s actions within its environment can be 
assigned a value such as utility or fitness, and  
b.) the agents change their behaviour so that they become suitable 
to a new situation.  
 
Agents may possess a number of mechanisms for adjusting their 
actions in an effort to improve their aptitude. Complex adaptive 
systems usually operate far from the global optimum (Holland and 
Miller, 1991).  
MAS therefore facilitate the “real-world” representation of actors 
within a system by taking into consideration the variation between 
individuals, and the effects of an individual’s action in precipitating 
global patterns. MAS assist the understanding of how global 
patterns in societies or economies emerge from an individual’s 
behaviour (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). The flexibility of this type of 
modelling tools “enables to improve both action and research 
outcomes through a process of iteration” involving researchers, 
local stakeholders and decision makers (Gummesson, 1991; 
Bunning, 1994; Allen, 2000). They have also been applied in 
economic studies of natural resource management in order to 
interpret possible processes of change (Balmann, 1997; Bousquet  
et al., 1999; Rouchier et al., 2000; Balmann et al., 2003; Ducrot et 
al., 2004; Farolfi et al., 2002 and 2008).   
A MAS, Biomas, was developed to simulate farming practices 
and effluent management in Réunion Island (Guerrin et al., 1998).  
With the exception of transportation costs, however, Biomas 
neglected the costs associated with effluent management. Instead, 
by allocating individual annual costs to each strategy of effluent 
management, Echos represents possible pig farmers’ reactions to 
the adoption of policy measures based on economic and regulatory 
incentives by local policy makers. Under certain hypotheses (e.g. 
economic rationality, cost minimisation) Echos enables the analysis of 
the dynamics of agents’ behaviour under different policy conditions. 
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Table 1. Pig farmers and their characteristics in the Echos multi-agent model 
 
Type Number Effluent Management n. of Sows with 
litters 
I 23 Do not own any spreading facility, rent spreading and transport services from other farmers. < 16 
II 30 Own spreading and transporting facilities for personal use. 16 - 42 
III 3 Own spreading and transporting facilities that are also 
rented out to farmers of type I. > 42 
 
 
 
 
However, when moving from the individual to the collective scale, 
if precise economic indicators on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the simulated policy options are sought, MAS analysis can be 
coupled with an economic approach for monetary valuation such as 
CBA.  
According to Layard and Glaister, in any CBA exercise it is 
recommended that one proceeds in two stages:  
 
a.) value the costs and benefits in each year of the project (in this 
case the policy option adopted); and  
b.) obtain an aggregate present value of the project by discounting 
costs and benefits in future years to make them commensurate with 
present costs and benefits, and then adding them up (Layard and 
Glaister, 1994). 
 
Aggregated costs and benefits deriving from different simulated 
policy options were then calculated for each year and a CBA over a 
ten-year period was implemented to obtain net present values 
(NPV) at year 0 for different policy options. Due to the nature of the 
analysis, the NPV standard formula was slightly adapted in order to 
calculate the present value of the cost for the implementation of a 
policy option (PVc). The modified formula was:  
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Where:  
Ct = costs of the policy option at year t 
Bt = benefits of the policy option at year t 
r  = discount rate 
n = years of policy implementation 
 
 
The multi-agent model Echos 
 
An area of approximately 100 km2 of Réunion was represented on a 
75 by 150 automated cellular grid. Each cell represented one 
hectare. The grid was divided into three regions corresponding to 
the topography of Réunion, namely Grand Ilet (Central Island) 
where pig rearing takes place, the coastal zone where sugarcane is 
cultivated, and an intermediate non-cultivated zone. 
Agents were used to represent 56 pig farmers, 6 sugarcane far- 
mers and a public authority responsible for defining the 
environmental policy. 
According to a direct survey conducted in Réunion Island in 2001 
(Farolfi, 2003), the size of pig breeding operations varies from 1 to 
50 sows with litters (SWL) per farm. Pig farmers in Echos were 
subdivided into three types. Each of these types manages its 
effluents differently, as indicated in Table 1. 
Annual effluent production by pig farmers was calculated as 
19.7m3 per SWL per annum. Since effluents in Réunion contain 
approximately 4 kg nitrogen per m3, this is equivalent to 78.8 kg of 
nitrogen per SWL per annum. Constant pig production was 
assumed throughout the analyses. According to Rainault and Paillat 
(1999), 1 m3 = 1T of effluent [Data for model calibration came from 
a survey performed between 1995 and 1999 in Grand Ilet on 
Réunion (Cf. Reynaud, 1995 and Renault and Paillat, 1999) on a 
population of 56 pig breeders. This survey showed that the average 
farm size was 15.17 SWL, and that the average surface area of a 
farm was 3.76 ha, including 1.32 ha of cultivated land, 1.99 ha of 
fallows and 0.45 ha of buildings including gardens (Renault and 
Paillat, 1999].  
Pig farmers were allocated farms within the Grand Ilet zone. The 
size of the farms was randomly selected within a pre-set range of 1 
to 17 ha and was determined by the number of SWL. Pig farms 
consisted of a random combination of fallow (50%) and cropped 
(50%) cells. The cropped cells were allocated a nitrogen absorption 
capacity of 387.6 kg/year (weighted average of the absorption 
capacity of current cultivated crops) and fallow cells an absorption 
capacity of zero (Renault and Paillat, 1999).  
Each of the sugarcane farmers was allocated a sugarcane 
plantation in the coastal zone. Sugarcane farm size was based on a 
random value between 20 and 40 ha.  
Two hypothetical solutions for collective treatment of pig slurry 
were introduced into the model: a compost station and a 
wastewater treatment plant called “Bio-Armor” (Farolfi, 2003). Their 
location within the spatial grid was based on technical reports 
published by local consulting companies (Cyathea, 1999). The 
assumption was made that these collective treatment plants have 
the capacity to treat the effluent of 850 SWL (the real pig population 
in Grand Ilet at the moment of the survey).  Echos allows running 
simulations where it can be chosen to activate one of the two 
technical solutions for collective treatment. 
Legal limits for nitrogen disposal per hectare and pollution taxes 
per kilogram of nitrogen in excess of the legal limits were then 
introduced as modifiable parameters to define the environmental 
policy to be implemented. 
A basic time step of one month was selected. In order to simulate 
monthly nitrogen diffusion in the environment in accordance with 
the topology of Réunion, it was assumed that 10% of the nitrogen 
present in each cell spread to lower lying cells each month.  Of this, 
50% spread to the eastern cells and 25% to the north-eastern and 
south-eastern cells respectively. At this stage of the modelling 
process, a nitrogen assimilation rate of 0.3% per month was 
allocated to all cells, irrespective of land use.  
Simulation of individual effluent management by pig breeders was 
based on the observations of, and data collected by, Aubry et al. 
(2001) and Renault and Paillat (1999). An effluent storage capacity 
was allocated to each pig farmer. 
   The  maximum storage  capacity is reached approximately every 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Activity diagram of pig farmers’ behaviour in terms of 
effluents management during a single time step (equivalent to one 
month) according to the strategy chosen 
 
 
four months, upon which farmers empty their tanks and spread the 
effluent on their own farms in quantities compliant with 
environmental legislation. Effluent in excess is spread on other 
farms legally available for effluent disposal (i.e. where the annual 
quantity of effluents/ha is still below the set legal limit) within a 1 km 
radius (Figure 1).  
Pig farmers can then dispose of the residual effluent by means of 
one of the following three strategies: 
 
Strategy 1: The farmer spreads the residual slurry on his own land 
with no regard for environmental legislation. 
 
Strategy 2: The farmer transports the residual slurry to the coastal 
sugarcane farmers, with preference for those closest to his farm. If 
there is no demand for effluent from sugarcane farmers, or if the 
effluent does not amount to a full transport load, the pig farmer 
spreads it on his own land. It is assumed that the only tools for 
effluent transport are a tractor and a trailer with a load capacity de- 
termined  by  the  simulation  parameters, with a default capacity of 
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10m3. Due to the pig farms location and the poor conditions of 
roads, this is the absolute maximum capacity of a transport load. 
The distance between the coastal zone and Grand Ilet (20 km), is 
used as the average distance separating pig farms and sugarcane 
farms. 
 
Strategy 3:  Farmer delivers the residual slurry to the collective 
treatment plant. 
 
Pig farmers’ generic annual cost function for slurry management 
can be represented as follows:  
 
),,,,,( ijijijijijijij COTRTXSPSTCLfC =  [2] 
 
Where:  
ijC   = Cost for the pig farmer of type j adopting the strategy i 
ijCL   = Cost of cleaning the stables 
ijST   = Cost of stocking the slurry 
ijSP   = Spreading cost 
ijTX   = Tax to be paid for slurry disposal above the legal limit 
ijTR   = Cost of slurry transportation to the coastal area 
ijCO   = Cost of collective treatment 
 i  = Adopted strategy (1, 2, or 3) 
 j  = Pig farmer type (I, II, or III) 
 
The variables represented in the generic formula assume different 
values (positive, negative, or 0) according to the type of pig farmer 
and the strategy adopted.  
A detailed illustration of the cost functions associated to each 
type of pig farmer and each adopted strategy is provided in 
Appendix 1.  
Echos analyses all costs incurred by the various strategies 
throughout the simulation. At the end of each simulated year, pig 
farmers are given the opportunity to adopt a less expensive 
strategy, based on comparison of previous year costs for different 
strategies.  
A parameter of behavioural inertia with a value between 0 and 1 
was introduced. A value of 1 indicates a 100% probability that a 
farmer would opt for a seemingly less expensive strategy, while a 
value of 0 corresponds to a 0% probability that the farmer would 
switch strategies, even if another strategy seems economically 
convenient.  
Sugarcane farmers spread nitrogen mineral fertilizer on their 
plantations according to crop requirements. The annual nitrogen 
requirement of 150 Kg per hectare of sugarcane used in Echos was 
obtained from the Union of Farming Cooperatives in Réunion 
(Urcoopa). Other estimates for sugarcane nitrogen requirements in 
Réunion range from 100 Kg/ha/year (Baldoni and Giardini, 1982) to  
200 Kg/ha/year (Reynaud, 1995). In Echos, sugarcane farmers can 
receive pig slurry free of charge from Grand Ilet and spread it on 
their plantations as a substitute of the expensive mineral fertiliser. 
Additional mineral fertiliser can be purchased when slurry is not 
available in sufficient quantities. 
   The sugarcane farmers’ annual generic cost function is 
represented as follows:  
 
),,( kkkk FSTSPfC =     [3] 
Where: 
kC  = Cost for the sugarcane farmer adopting strategy k 
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Table 2. Values of Echos fixed variables 
 
Variable Value 
Pig farmers initialised in strategy  1 
Sugarcane farmers initialised in stragegy 5 
Farmers change strategy during the simulation? Yes 
Likelihood of strategy change 0.5 
Collective treatment Compost 
Legal limit N (Kg/ha) 170 
Proportion stocking cost subsidised  0 
Rate utilisation machinery 0.2 
Levy charged for transport services (%TR) 0.03 
Price mineral N (/Kg) 1.52 
 
 
 
kSP = Cost of spreading mineral fertiliser (or slurry) 
kST  = Cost of stocking the slurry imported from the pig farms 
kF  = Cost of buying mineral fertilisers  
k = Adopted strategy (4 = spreading mineral fertilisers; 5 = 
spreading slurry; 6 = spreading both)  
A detailed description of sugarcane farmers’ cost functions is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Simulating policy options 
 
20 variables (a complete list is included in Appendix 2) 
can be manipulated in Echos in order to run different 
simulations regarding slurry management in the Grand 
Ilet area. Since the main objective of this paper is the 
evaluation of environmental policy options, only the 
results of  simulations run by changing  the following va- 
riables are shown: pollution charge at year 0; biennial 
increase in the pollution charge; proportion of variable tr- 
ansportation cost subsidised; load transportation capa-
city; price of compost (which, when subsidised, can 
reflect the level of public subsidy for a collective compost 
plant); and, only for some simulations, tariffs for renting 
out transporting facilities, as well as the size of sugarcane 
farms.  
The other variables are fixed at the levels indicated in 
Table 2. The compost plant was preferred to the “Bio-
Armor” facility as the collective treatment solution. 
All simulations are run over a period of 10 years, and 
all pig farmers initially adopt strategy 1. Analysed outputs 
are the choice of effluent management strategy by pig 
farmers, the cost of effluent management for both pig 
farmers and sugarcane farmers, and the total nitrogen 
accumulated in Grand Ilet and in the coastal area.   
Fixing the legal limit for slurry spreading in the pig 
farming  area  at 170 KgN/ha/year,  which corresponds to 
the one of a structural excess zone, a number of  combi-                                                                                       
binations of “positive” and “negative” economic incentives  
 
 
 
 
taxes and  subsidies  respectively and their impact on the 
above mentioned outputs, can be explored (Table 2). 
In the two policy options selected for analysis, a 
progressive increase of environmental taxes, combined 
with different levels of subsidies to cover effluent disposal 
costs, is simulated.  
 
Policy option 1: Combining progressive tax and 
slurry transportation subsidies  
 
Pollution charge at year 0 = 0 ; progressive pollution 
charge = +0.76 /kg excess nitrogen every 2 years; 
proportion of variable transportation cost subsidised = 
70%; load transportation capacity = 40 KgN; price of 
compost = 38 /T. 
In this scenario, a progressive tax is introduced and 
combined with a subsidy for transportation costs, whilst 
the compost collective plant is not subsidised. Figure 2 
illustrates the dynamics of strategy choices by pig 
farmers within this legal context. 
Starting from year 5, some pig farmers (type I) shift 
from strategy 1 to 3, and starting from year 7, other 
farmers (type II first, then also type III) shift from strategy 
1 to 2. At the end of the simulation, pig farmers in 
strategy 2 are more numerous than those in strategy 3, 
but 36 farmers (15 type I, 19 type II, and 2 type III) are 
still in strategy 1, whilst 11 (type II and III) are in strategy 
2, and 9 (8 type I and 1 type II) are in strategy 3. 
A progressively increasing pollution tax forces pig 
farmers to modify their effluent management approach. 
However, at the end of the simulation, a relatively large 
number of pig farmers opt to keep following the status 
quo strategy, despite strong economic incentives (pollu- 
tion charge at 3 /kgN, and a 70% variable transport cost 
subsidy) to move to one of the alternatives. 
Starting from year 7, sugarcane farmers receive slurry 
from the pig farming area and consequently their annual 
cost pattern is affected (Figure 3). 
Expenditure on mineral nitrogen for sugarcane decrea- 
es, while spreading and stocking costs increase propor- 
tionally to the transfer of slurry from Grand Ilet to the 
coastal area. A limited positive effect on the accumulation 
of additional nitrogen in the soil is observed (from 550 T 
[Cumulated additional quantity of nitrogen in the soil at 
year 10 if all pig farmers stay in strategy 1] to 500 T at 
year 10) due to the combined effects of effluent transfer 
to the sugarcane farms and composting (Figure 4).  
The problem represented by the technological and 
infrastructural limitations to the slurry transportation out of 
Grand Ilet was previously mentioned. One could then 
make the hypothesis that roads are improved, which 
allows for the transit of trucks with a loading capacity of 
200 kgN = 50 T of slurry per trip. Disregarding the costs 
associated with road construction work, as well as the 
capital investment in a new truck, some scenarios 
introducing the improved loading capacity in the previous 
context were run. 
  
 
 
Farolfi et al.        655 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
numberOfSt rat egy1 numberOf St rategy2
numberOfSt rat egy3
year
n
 
 
Figure 2.  Policy option 1: Pig farmers’ strategies 
 
 
 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 103 109 115
costOf St ocking costOfSpreading costOf Nit rogen
/year
month
46000
23000
 
 
Figure 3. Policy option 1: Annual costs for sugarcane farmers 
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Figure 4. Policy option 1:  Nitrogen dynamics 
 
 
Simulations show that, ceteris paribus, the improved 
technology does not expedite sensibly the switch to 
strategy 2 among pig farmers. However, when doubling 
the tax progression (1.52 /kg excess nitrogen every 2 
years), a dramatic change in the pattern of strategy choice 
is observed (Figure 5).  
In this case, due to the limited surface area of sugarcane 
farms, the demand of slurry in the coastal area is satura- 
ted at year 8. As a consequence, in the following years 
pig farmers willing to abandon strategy 1 are obliged to 
choose strategy 3.  
  However, simulations run  doubling the available sugar- 
cane farm surface, show that at year  10 the nitrogen de- 
mand is not saturated.  At this level of pollution tax (4.58 
/KgN at year 7 and 6.10 /KgN at year 9) an increasing 
number of pig farmers prefer the unsubsidised collective 
compost plant rather than heavily  subsidised transporta- 
tion to the coastal area. 
 
Policy option 2: Combining progressive tax and 
subsidies for collective compost plant  
 
Pollution charge at year 0 = 0 ; progressive pollution 
charge = +0.3 /kg excess nitrogen every 2 years; 
proportion of variable transportation cost subsidised = 
0%; load transportation capacity = 40 KgN; price of 
compost = 84 /T. 
A lower progressive tax (+0.3 /kg excess nitrogen 
every 2 years) combined with a subsidised price for the 
compost produced at the collective station that includes 
the public subsidy will induce all pig farmers to choose 
strategy 3 by year 10 (Figure 6). In this option farmers 
choosing strategy 3 receive a public subsidy of 46  for 
each T of compost. This subsidy covers 50% of the annual 
cost of the collective plant.  
This behaviour by pig farmers would have a sensibly 
positive effect on the amount of additional nitrogen 
accumulated in the area (Figure 7). 
   Introducing in the simulation a public subsidy that 
covers 57% of the collective compost station annual cost, 
all pig farmers adopt strategy 3 by year two without any 
pollution charge.  
 
 
Coupling multi-agent simulations (MAS) and cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) 
 
Annual farmer’s costs and benefits calculated through 
simulations run  with  Echos were first aggregated to  ob- 
tain collective values by type of farmers and for the whole 
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Figure 5.  Policy option 1 doubling tax progression and improving roads: Pig farmers’ strategies 
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Figure 6.  Policy option 2: Pig farmers’ strategies 
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Figure 7.  Policy option 2: Nitrogen dynamics 
 
 
whole study area. Then the choice of a discount rate and 
the use of equation [1] allowed obtaining the present 
value of the cost (PVc) for the simulated adoption of two 
different policy options. Table 3 illustrates the results of 
this analysis applied to the policy option consisting of a 
high tax (3 /KgN) over the whole simulated period 
combined with a subsidy covering 70% of slurry transpor- 
tation costs [In the previous section, a tax progression 
every 2 years was simulated. A constant level of tax in 
the CBA analysis simplifies calculations and reduces the 
number of variables changing overtime]. For this policy 
option, the surface of sugarcane farms in the coastal area 
was randomly set between 20 and 40 ha in the first 
scenario and between 40 and 80 ha in the second one. 
Costs and benefits of this option were then compared 
with costs and benefits of the policy option consisting of a 
lower tax (0.7 /KgN) over the whole period and a 
subsidy covering 42% of the annual cost of a collective 
compost plant. No subsidy for transportation costs was 
contemplated in this second option. 
The following incremental costs compared to the status 
quo were considered: incremental cost for pig farmers 
[resulting  from  the pollution taxes plus the cost of tran- 
port, or the unsubsidised cost of collective treatment, 
according to the policy option analysed. The reduction of 
spreading costs contributes to the reduction of this 
incremental cost] and annual subsidies to be paid by 
public institutions in order to cover slurry transportation or 
collective treatment costs. 
On the other side, incremental benefits were represent- 
by  the  annual  cost reduction for sugarcane farmers (re- 
from the use of free pig slurry instead of buying mineral 
fertilisers),  and  the  double dividend for the society pro- 
by the tax payment for the spread of slurry above the 
legal limit on structural excess areas.  
The reduction of accumulated additional nitrogen in the 
soil at year ten of the simulation was then calculated, as 
this represents the positive environmental impact of the 
adopted  policy  with  respect to the status quo. The dis- 
counted cost of the adopted policy was then expressed in 
absolute terms and in terms of cost per unit of reduced 
pollution.  
Analyses were conducted over a period of ten years, 
using  a discount  rate of 6%, a higher value than the pre- 
inflation rate in Réunion. This discount rate accounts for 
the risk of the investments (Table 3). 
   Results indicate that the policy option consisting of a 
lower tax combined with a subsidy for the collective 
compost plant is the less expensive. Furthermore, its 
impact in terms of pollution reduction is higher. Increasing 
the available surface in the coastal zone improves only 
marginally the results of the policy option aimed at 
transferring effluent to the sugarcane plots. In addition, 
the feasibility of the second policy option is far higher 
when compared to the previous one. In particular, the 
high tax imposed on pig farmers in order to push them to 
adopt a strategy of transfer of effluent to the coastal zone 
is  not  acceptable  in  the specific context, and does not 
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Table 3.  Present values in  of the incremental cost (PVc) of two policy options over a ten year simulation (r=6%) 
 
Option 1. Subsidising effluent transport to sugarcane farms ( 20 ha > 40 ha) 
 Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOTAL 
Subsidy  0 166, 931 226,565 226,565 226,565 226,565 226,565 226,565 226,565 226,565 1,979,450 
 cost PF  229,618 220,550 213,130 216,031 198,321 228,855 222,748 209,008 219,695 196,336 2,154,290 
Double dividend  229,618 163,969 138,473 138,931 125,191 151,145 145,038 135,878 141,985 123,206 1,493435 
  cost PF  0 3,176 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,580 4,580 39,817 
Policy option cost  0 220,336 296,641 299,084 295,115 299,695 299,695 295,115 299,695 295,115 2,600,489 
Residual N (Kg)  483,216 
        
PVc 6%        1,840,518 
Reduced N (Kg)  95,047 
      
 PVc /KgN reduced                 19.36 
Option 1. Subsidising effluent transport to sugarcane farms ( 40 ha > 80 ha) 
 Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOTAL 
Subsidy  0 198,779 239, 746 242,952 309,924 360,509 423,919 304,936 337,710 297,099 2,715,573 
 cost PF  219,847 225,038 200,763 199,5452 190,076 216,489 221,832 198,015 212,366 192,061 2,076,031 
Double dividend  219,847 153,282 121,374 119,389 88,244 91,145 74,198 98,321 98,626 95,725 1,160,153 
 cost PF  0 12,258 14,406 18,940 19,460 22,437 26,391 19,047 21,032 18,482 172,453 
Policy option cost  0 258,276 304,729 304,164 392,296 463,416 545,161 385,584 430,418 374,953 3,458,997 
Residual N (Kg)  403,216 
        
PVc 6%        2,415,103 
Reduced N (Kg)  175,684 
       
PVc /KgN reduced                 13.75 
Option 2. Subsidising  Compost collective station 
 Year 1 2 3 5 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOTAL 
Subsidy (disc.)  0 175,105 181,940 202,613 194,944 215,451 217,451 208,449 221,619 202,947 1,820,520 
 PF Collective 
syst. (disc) 
  0 16,183 10,687 9,924 24,122 9,924 23,053 16,489 29,466 12,519 167,939 
PF Tax  104,885 52,214 32,519 10,909 687 382 198 840 840 794 204,268 
Double Dividend  104,885 52,214 32,519 10,909 687 382 198 840 840 794 204,268 
Net costs (but 
subs.) 
 0 191,288 192,627 226,736 204,868 238,504 242,947 224,937 251,085 215,466 1,988,458 
Residual N (Kg)  135,834 
       
 PVc 6%        1,988,458 
Reduced N (Kg)  443,066 
       
PVc /KgN reduced                 4.49     
 
Notes:  
1) PF = Pig Farmers; SF = Sugarcane Farmers 
2) Annual values for collective system subsidies and pig farmers’ collective treatment costs are discounted in the simulation 
 
 
 660       Afr. J. Agric. Res. 
 
 
 
reflect  the  general  orientation of the environmental pro- 
tection policy in France and in the EU.   
Other structural and technical constraints linked to the 
transfer of effluent to the coastal area, namely the poor 
quality of the roads and the consequent low capacity load 
for slurry, were already mentioned. An improvement of 
the road connections between Grand Ilet and the coastal 
area would correspond to high additional costs that are 
not considered in this analysis. In this simulation, an 
optimistic load capacity for transportation of 20T of slurry 
was taken into account, corresponding to 80 KgN per trip. 
In fact, as already mentioned, the current state of the 
roads in the studied area allows only a load capacity of 
10T of slurry. 
Summarising, the results of the presented simulations 
show clearly that a “stick and carrot” policy based on the 
combined use of environmental taxes and subsidies 
would be effective in the studied context either through 
the adoption of a pollution tax higher than 0.3/KgN, or 
by coupling it with a subsidy covering a significant share 
of the alternative strategy’s annual cost. In other terms, a 
low level of economic instruments does not seem to be 
sufficient to induce pig farmers toward a strategy of 
effluent management alternative to the present one, i.e. 
spreading all organic matter on the Grand Ilet plots. 
In particular, at subsidy levels below 70% of the annual 
transportation cost, the transfer of effluent to the coastal 
area does not look attractive for the pig farmers 
(especially for those who do not own spreading and 
transport facilities).  
The CBA was conducted on the two options that MAS 
simulations indicated to be the most applicable to the 
studied context showed that a lower tax on effluents 
coupled with a subsidized collective compost station 
would be economically more viable, socially more accep- 
table, and environmentally more effective than the option 
aimed at facilitating the transfer of organic matter towards 
the sugarcane farms of the coastal area. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
Pollution  and  environmental  impacts of the agricultural 
sector are  considered to have a growing importance in 
both  industrialised  and developing countries. Policy ma- 
kers are concerned with the negative consequences on 
the ecological systems of intensive production activities 
such as livestock breeding.  
To address this problem, decision-support tools able to 
represent the complexity of the systems at stake made of 
social, economic and ecological components are highly 
required.  
MAS are powerful tools to represent complex systems 
and the dynamic interactions among different and spatia-                               
lised agents in a specific context. Due to their features – 
dynamic illustration of simulations, simultaneous conside-         
 
 
 
           
ration of economic and ecological variables, spatialised 
representation of agents and the capacity to make them 
interact - MAS provide a sound basis for the creation of 
decision-making tools to define environmental policies at 
a local level. Compared to economic models based on 
mathematical optimisation techniques, MAS are more 
capable of encompassing the complexity of the 
economic, ecological, social and ethical relations involved 
in the management of environmental impacts. 
However, policy makers need to challenge the status 
quo by reducing pollution through the selection of the 
policy option that guarantees the lowest possible cost to 
society (Baumol and Oates, 1988). To combine the accu- 
racy of the representation of a dynamic socio-economic 
and environmental complex system like the presented 
one with the pragmatism of the actual cost calculation for 
the implementation of a policy option, this study proposed 
to couple a MAS with a CBA. 
The scope of the MAS developed was to interpret the 
economic behaviour of pig farmers in Réunion Island 
subsequent to the adoption of different environmental 
policy options.  In  the multi-agent model Echos, pig far- 
mers and sugarcane growers are numerous, and distribu- 
ted over a given area with specific characteristics. Pig 
farmers own farms of different sizes and animal  popula- 
tion, and have different characteristics in terms of the 
availability of spreading facilities. 
The use of MAS enabled the consideration of multiple 
components, thereby creating a representation of a com- 
plex reality. More specifically, it combined both economic 
and ecological dynamics in a spatial model. The agents 
studied could adopt different strategies and evolved 
during a simulation. In other words, multi-agent modelling 
enabled the illustration of certain mechanisms that would 
be difficult to pinpoint using standard economic modelling 
methods. 
The agents of Echos were assumed to be rational and 
well informed. However, economic players who are not 
entirely rational or only partly informed can also be inclu- 
ded in MAS. These types of behaviour, not described in 
this paper, will be included in future project developments. 
The model allowed combining the dynamics of nitrogen 
produced, transported and assimilated by the soil with all 
economic simulations. This feature of the MAS is very 
useful for the construction of tools for decision-making 
and negotiation among different stakeholders, since the 
environmental measures are tested not only in terms of 
economic efficiency and effectiveness, but also in terms 
of environmental sustainability. 
 Simulations run through Echos allowed identifying some 
policy options that seemed able to match the mentioned 
socio-economic and environmental criteria for the study 
area. These policy options were then tested in terms of 
economic costs and benefits for the society through the 
implementation of a CBA on the data calculated by the 
MAS.  
  
 
 
Although the exercise remained at an experimental 
level, it showed the potential utility of combining a 
standard evaluation method such as CBA with MAS. In 
particular, the possibility to rank the different simulated 
scenarios through universally recognised economic 
criteria, such as NPV, widens significantly the field of 
application for MAS as decision and negotiation support 
tools when policy options must be chosen. 
In future developments of Echos, more  complex beha- 
vioural patterns, which differ from one agent to another 
can be introduced, since MAS provide a good means to 
represent agents possessing limited information and 
pursuing objectives other than profit maximization alone. 
The introduction of different strategies in a system of 
evolutionary games (Weibull, 1995) should  allow  illustra- 
ting the system's response to the introduction  of techno- 
logical or procedural innovations. Various forms  of coor- 
dination between players will be analysed and a system 
of transferable pollution permits will be explored.  
Finally, since a great deal of importance is attached to 
the ecological dynamics simulated by a model which is 
basically economic in nature, the methods used to repre- 
sent the behaviour of nitrogen in the soil (diffusion rates 
that vary according to the slope and nature of the soil, 
different levels of soil leaching, crop assimilation 
capacities, etc.) will be improved. 
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APPENDIX 1: Cost functions for pig farmers and sugarcane farmers referred to the chosen strategy 
 
The calculations contained in Farolfi (2003) and based on field surveys conducted in 2001, enabled the definition of 
average annual cost functions related to each strategy of slurry management in Grand Ilet (Réunion).  
As for the individual management, the following basic operations have been identified: cleaning, stocking, and 
spreading. For each operation, average cost functions1 were estimated according to the size of the pig farm (n. of sows 
with litters - SWL).   
These cost functions, whose specific parameters were calculated through regressions on field data, are of the form: 
 
baXAC −=  ;  0<b<1 
 
Where:  
 
AC         = Average cost 
X  = Pig farm size (SWL) 
a and b  = Parameters estimated for each operation (tab. A1) 
 
 
Table A1.  Average cost functions’ parameters for individual management operations  
 
 Cleaning Stocking* Spreading 
(variable) 
Spreading (fixed) 
a 77.2 10.1 46.5 57.8 
b 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.7 
R2 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
* for sugarcane farmers: a = 15.6; b = 0.35 
Parameters in bold have significance levels > 95% 
 
Spreading for type I = e  
 
e = 





=
=
=
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3
1
3
2
1
e
e
e
  
 
Constant values for the average cost of collective treatment, as well as for slurry transportation costs were calculated 
from various studies as indicated below. 
A conversion rate allows using the same cost functions for both pig farmers and sugarcane farmers. If the nitrogen 
needs for sugarcane are considered to be 150 kgN/ha, since 1 SWL produces 78.8 kgN/year (Rainault – Paillat, 1999), 
1 hectare will require the equivalent of 1.9 SWL/year. 
The average cost for the pig farmer that decides to use a collective station for treating the exceeding pollution is Ccoll. 
The hypothesis was made that a farmer who decides to use a collective station for treating the exceeding pollution is 
totally relieved of any responsibility with respect to that pollution. Therefore, the cost corresponds to a tariff that the 
breeder pays to the collective station’s manager. This tariff, which must cover at least investment and operating costs of 
the collective station, is in /kgN. Data corresponding to different types of collective stations are detailed in Farolfi 
(2003).  
 
These average cost functions are crucial elements for building the annual total cost functions for each type of 
stockbreeder or sugarcane farmer, according to the chosen slurry management strategy.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 These functions give annual costs in  /m3 of slurry. For the cost in /KgN the cost should be divided by 4. 
Farolfi et al.        663 
 
 
 
Pig farmers’ annual cost functions (referring to the generic cost function [2] in the text): 
As illustrated in the text, pig farmers can choose one of the three following strategies:  
 
1) Spreading all slurry in Grand Ilet; 
2) Transporting the excess slurry in the coastal area; 
3) Conveying the excess slurry to a collective station for treatment (here the cases of a compost station and « Bio-
Armor » facility are illustrated).  
 
 
The following formulas represent the total annual cost for each type of farmer and for each strategy of slurry 
management.  
 
Terms used in the formulas for cost:  
 
Cij = Annual pig farmer’s total cost for the three strategies (/year) (I = 1,2,3; j = I, II, III) 
 
Cfi = Component of the cost function common to the three types of pig farmers for a given strategy  
 
z =  type I farmers delivering slurry to a type III farmer; n = 23 
 
p = Organic matter (OM) produced every year by the stockbreeder (KgN/year)2 
 
∆p = Exceeding OM (KgN/year); ∆p = p-p*.Sp, where: p* = Norm for spreading (KgN/ha), and Sp = pig farm surface  
 
p1 = OM transported outside Grand Ilet, where: 0<p1<∆p (KgN/year) 
 
τp = Unitary pollution charge (/KgN); it is applied to ∆p 
 
Cl = Average cleaning cost (/KgN) 
 
St = Average stocking cost (/KgN) 
 
Spf = Fixed average spreading cost (/KgN) 
 
Spv = Variable average spreading cost (/KgN) 
 
Ccoll = Average cost for using a collective treatment facility (/KgN) 
 
TCv= Variable transport cost (/Km/KgN) 
 
d = Distance between Grand Ilet and the coastal zone (Km) 
 
S = Proportion of stocking cost not subsidized, where: 0<S<1 
 
T = Use rate of spreading facilities, where: 0<T<1 
 
K = Constant cost for anti-smell products (0.2/KgN) 
 
e =  Fixed tariff (/m3) paid by type I farmers to type III farmers for spreading, where: e1=1; e2= 3 ; e3=6  
 
TT = Fixed tariff for slurry transport : proportion of TCv that type I farmer pays to type III farmer in addition to TCv for effluents transport, where: 0<TT<1 
 
The formulas illustrated below are conceived to be introduced in the multi-agent model Echos. Therefore the effluent 
quantities that a type III pig farmer treats in addition to his effluent are represented by the quantities of p and p1 that type 
I pig farmers decide deliver to type III for spreading or transporting: (
=
n
z
zz pp
0
1 ),( ). According to our field surveys, this 
formulation corresponds to an average coefficient equal to 1.225 to be multiplied by farmer III’s p.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
  To calculate p, we consider that a SWL produces 19.7 tonnes/year of effluents and that the average size of a farm is 15.17 SWL. 
Hence, since 1 T of effluents corresponds to 4 kgN, p = 1,195.39 KgN/year for the average farm (cf. Renault and Paillat, 1999). 
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Spreading all in Grand Ilet (Strategy 1) 
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Transporting p1  in the coastal area (Strategy 2), where: pp ∆≤≤ 10  
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Using a collective system facility for treating the exceeding pollution (Strategy 3): p1=∆p 
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Sugarcane farmers’ annual cost functions (referring to the generic cost function [3] in the text): 
 
The following terms have been added to those employed in the previous formulas: 
 
α = Sugarcane needs in nitrogen (Kg/ha/year ; here α = 150) 
 
Ss = Surface cultivated with sugarcane by the farmer (ha ; here 20<Ss<40) 
 
St sug = Average stocking cost for sugarcane farmer (/KgN)3 
 
Sp v min = Variable average spreading cost for mineral fertilizers4 
 
f = Price of mineral fertilizers (/KgN ; here f = 1.5) 
 
The following formulas represent the annual total cost related to nitrogen fertilising for the sugarcane farmers in the 
coastal area. 3 strategies are illustrated. 
 
 
Spreading mineral fertilizers5 
 
).(. min4 sugvfs StfSpSpTSC +++=α  
 
 
Spreading slurry from pig breeders  
 
)..(.5 KSStSpSpTSC sugvfs +++= α  
 
 
Spreading both6 
 
111min6 .)...(.).)((... pKSSStpSppSfSpSSpTC ssugvsvsf +++−++= ααα  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This average cost differs from the one calculated for pig breeders. In fact the stocking tanks required here are larger, and therefore 
the cost functions cannot be the same as in Grand Ilet.  
 
4
 This cost (cf. Farolfi et al, 2002) is considered to be independed of the spreaded quantity of fertilizer (0.1 /KgN). Due to the far 
higher nitrogen concentration in mineral fertilizers, this cost is much lower than the one we obtain through the function Spv. 
 
5
 The last term of the function will exist only if the farmer decides at least once to spread slurry during the simulation. He has therefore 
invested in stocking facilities. If he comes back to mineral fertilizers, he will continue to pay fixed stocking costs for the whole 
simulation.   
  
6
 This strategy is not considered in the present version of Echos. 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
Table A2. Simulation variables in Echos 
 
Name  Values 
Pig farmers initialised in strategy  1; 2; or 3 
Sugarcane farmers initialised in stragegy 4 or 5 
Do the farmers change strategy during the 
simulation? Yes or No 
Likelihood change stragegy 1 0 to 1 
Likelihood change stragegy 2 0 to 1 
Likelihood change stragegy 3 0 to 1 
Collective treatment Compost or Bio-Armor 
Legal limit N (KgN/ha) 0 to 1000 
Initial tax pollution (/kgN) 0 to 15 
Tax pollution Increase every 2 years (/kgN) 0 to 3 
Proportion variable TC subsidised  0 to 1 
Proportion stocking cost subsidised  0 to 1 
Rate utilisation machinery 0 to 1 
Capacity transport N (kgN) 0 to 200 
Levy charged for transport services (%TR) 0 to 1 
Price mineral N (/KgN) 0 to 4.5 
Minimum size of a sugarcane farm (ha) 20 to 40 
Maximum size of a sugarcane farm (ha) 40 to 80 
Price of compost (/T) 0 to 89 
Price for renting out spreading facilities (/KgN) 0.25; 0.75; or 1.52 
 
